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Abstract 
Experiments evaluate the fit of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index to a controlled human 
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rooms under supervision. Earnings serve as a measure of power. Chat rooms and processes for 
selecting subjects reduce or eliminate extraneous political forces, leaving logrolling as the 
primary political force. Initial proposals by subjects for division of the purse allow measurement 
of effects from focal points and transaction costs. Net results closely fit the Shapley-Shubik 
Power Index.  
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1 
1. Introduction 
The Shapley Value and its normalisation the Shapley-Shubik Power Index exist in a game-
theoretical, mathematical world of axioms and results.  Humans exist in a world of space, time 
and social relationships. Is their world separated from ours by a chasm or a crack? Is that world 
close enough to ours to illuminate interesting questions, or is it a beautiful but distant light in the 
sky? We use relatively unstructured bargaining experiments in an environment tailored to power 
indices to investigate these questions. 
Three reasonable assumptions (efficiency, symmetrical players, and independent games) 
yield the Shapley Value of participating in a game (Shapley 1953). Normalising the Shapley 
Value over all players in a game (usually voters with different numbers of votes) gives the 
Shapley-Shubik Power Index (SSPI) of the capacity for each player to influence election results 
(Shapley and Shubik 1954).  However, the players and votes in these game-theoretical constructs 
are not the flesh and blood voters casting ballots in the institutions that we experience.  
Scholars such as Morriss (1987), Garrett and Tsebelis (1999), Saari (1999), Holler and Napel 
(2004) and Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004) question the usefulness of power indices. Power 
indices are abstract mathematical representations of the ability of voters to affect group decisions 
and which focus on votes per se in isolation from other political considerations such as 
resources, traditional alliances, charismatic leadership, or shared agendas. One major concern is 
that power indices, being general, do not address particulars of human institutions (Garrett and 
Tsebelis 1999).  Morriss (1987) stresses that power is potential, and so is not observable or 
measurable. Steffen 2002 presents arguments (and counter-arguments) that the abstract Focused Power Geller Mustard Shahwan 
mathematics of game theory cannot relate directly to human institutions or human behaviour.  
Empirical investigations of power indices have shown very weak performance by the SSPI and 
other power indices, perhaps due to the complexity of the study environments. See Felsenthal 
and Machover 1995, 1998 for overviews. Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi (2004) empirically 
determine that power in US and European elections increases with the size of voting blocks, but 
increases at a decreasing rate.  The SSPI, and the Banzhaf Power Index that the authors 
specifically address, show power tending to increase at an increasing rate with size of voting 
block.  
We accept the sceptics’ theoretical position and whole-hearted agree that the Shapley value 
and the SSPI exist in a world distinct from ours. But we wonder how distinct. We do not accept 
the empirical results as definitely showing that power indices differ widely from human 
institutional voting power.  Previous empirical studies occur in complex natural institutions 
which may have caused the consistently weak results.  
Whereas many empirical studies indicate a chasm divides the abstract power indices from 
empirical observations, one recent study found that power as estimated by the SSPI accounted 
for between 60 and 90 percent of European Union’s agricultural spending share per country 
(Kauppi and Widgrén 2004). This result suggests that the SSPI captures something important 
about voting power in a human institution. They also refer to earlier non-peer-reviewed 
publications that found strong links between budget allocations and the SSPI. However due to 
the complexity of potential political dealing in the EU, Kauppi and Widgrén searched many 
hypothetical alliances of countries to find vote structures that correspond to the observed 
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subsidies, so it is unclear to what degree their results reflect underlying power in contrast to 
being a product of the search.  
These empirical studies of power do not evaluates relative performance of the index in large 
versus small blocks of votes. If a power index systematically underestimated the power in large 
voting blocks but overestimated the power of small blocks, the studies could well show the 
power index as accurate.  
In spite of weak empirical support, power indices have been applied to a variety of political 
and business environments to predict or account for influence over decisions. Felsenthal and 
Machover (1998) provide an excellent overview of various applications to the European Union 
and its predecessors and to the United States. Bilbao et al (2000) and Algaba et al (2001) apply 
power indices in the context of the expanding European Union. Other political applications 
include the United Nations (Penrose 1946), passage of laws in the United States (Shapley and 
Shubik 1954), United States Presidential elections (Mann and Shapley 1962, Banzhaf 1968, 
Lambert 1988). The U.S. Supreme Court cases of Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), and 
New York City Board of Estimate v Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) are particularly relevant because 
they reject the use of the Banzhaf index on theoretical and intuitive grounds. One suspects that 
empirical support for a power index, had it existed at the time, could have affected the court’ 
decisions. (See Felsenthal and Machover 1998 for a listing of other US court cases that use 
power indices.) Business applications include Birmingham UK airport landing fees (Littlechild 
and Thompson 1977, with many extensions and replies), costing of joint projects (Tijs and 
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Branzei 2001), bank ATM interchange fees (Gow and Thomas 1998) and power on corporate 
boards (Leech 2002, Chen 2003). 
This paper uses a novel experimental approach to effectively isolate voting power from other 
institutional influences while leaving free reign for negotiation among six voters. We 
experimentally measures the level of power embodied in large blocks of votes by placing sets of 
six subjects in computer chat rooms, giving them different numbers of votes, issuing them $15, 
and having them divide the money by majority rule, as will be detailed in Section 3 below. Our 
measure of power is the percentage of earnings captured by the subject with the most votes.  
These earnings are averaged over many rounds of play for each of several vote profiles. 
Effectively, we measure the degree to which power compounds with the size of voting blocks 
within each profile relative to the degree designated by the SSPI. Results supporting the SSPI 
would encourage confidence in using it as a control for pure voting power in investigations of 
other political and socio-economic aspects of group decision making.  Results divergent from the 
SSPI, even in this environment tailored for power indices, would undermine confidence in 
applying it in more natural institutions.  
Section 2 of this paper further explains power indices, specifically defining the SSPI. Section 
3 describes the experiment. Section 4 gives our analysis of the experiment: evaluating our pursuit 
of homogeneity, identifying the effects of focal points and transaction costs. Section 5 presents 
results and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Shapley-Shubik power index 
The central idea of power indices is estimating the influence of the number of votes held by a 
player in an environment effectively isolated from other political forces (Felsenthal and 
Machover 1998). In the world of power indices players face a series of independent decisions; 
the players share no history; they have no overlap in their interests; they differ in their votes but 
the players are all identical in other respects.  
Voting power is not a proportionate or simple translation of the size of voting blocks. 
Suppose there are four players (political parties, shareholders, countries, etc) with 52, 45, 2, and 
1 vote each while a majority of at least 51 votes decides the outcome. Compact notation 
expresses the required majority preceding a semi-colon followed by a list of the votes: {51; 52, 
45, 2, 1}. The first player can determine all decisions and so has 100% of the electoral power 
while the others have none. With the superficially similar profile {51; 46, 45, 6, 3} any two of 
the first three players can form a majority of votes, and the fourth cannot help any other players 
form a majority. Thus, the power in this case divides between the four players as follows: 1/3, 
1/3, 1/3, and 0. The first three players have equal power even though they are different in their 
votes, while the latter two with similar numbers of votes are very different in power. The fourth 
player is a ‘dummy’ because it cannot turn any losing coalition into a winning coalition. All 
major power indices – Shapley-Shubik (1954, and Shapley 1953); Penrose (1946), Banzhaf 
(1965) Coleman (1971), Johnston (1977, 1978), Deegan-Packel (1978), Intervals (Taylor and 
Zwicker 1997), Holler-Packel (1983), etc – agree with these interpretations. When the number of 
players increases, results become more complex and different indices can yield different 
outcomes, even opposite rankings of power (Saari and Sierberg 1999). 
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In 1953, Shapley developed an abstract measure of the value of playing a game based upon 
three key assumptions. 1) The game is abstract ‘symmetric’; it is the number of votes controlled 
by a player that matters, not the player’s personality, name, or any other characteristic. 2) The 
game is efficient in that all possible gains are captured. 3) If two independent games are merged, 
then the value for each player in the merged game equals that sum of that player’s value in the 
two games played separately, ‘additivity’. For example, the value of two lottery tickets from 
different games, when purchased as a package, equals the sum of the values of the two tickets 
separately. This assumption does not fit all games; when buying two tickets from the same raffle, 
the purchase of the second ticket marginally reduces the probability of the first ticket winning.  
“It is remarkable that no further conditions are required to determine the value uniquely” 
(Shapley 1953, 309). However, these are sufficient conditions, not necessary ones. As Shapley 
1953 notes, other sets of sufficient conditions exist. By formula, the Shapley value φ  for a player 
i is:  
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where v is a game expressed as a set function, S is a set of players, N is a carrier of S i.e. S 
together with any dummy players, s and n are the sizes of S and N.  
Shapley and Shubik (1954) apply the Shapley value to politics. They normalize the Shapley 
value so that the sum of all players’ values equals one, by dividing each player’s value by the 
sum of all players’ values. This normalized form of the Shapley value is the Shapley-Shubik 
power index.  
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Power indices estimate the power embodied in blocks of votes that allows players to 
negotiate using those votes, with no shared interests between players and no other differences 
between players. Natural environments such as international organizations, legislatures, or board 
rooms are excellent environments for application of power indices. Power indices should 
distinguish influence deriving from votes in these environments and facilitate identifying 
influences deriving from other sources. However, these environments may be unsuited for direct 
evaluations of power indices because voters in those environments differ in many dimensions 
and often share interests, violating symmetry. In contrast, our experiment approximates the 
conditions that underlie power indices, allowing more effective and direct evaluation of the 
applicability of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index to human institutional voting power. 
3. Experiment 
3.1. Experiment Outline 
Our experiments consist of six student ‘subjects’ (actual people) taking the roles of ‘players’ 
(game theoretical constructs) and meeting in an online chat room with a proctor and recorder 
who supervise the play and who assign some number of votes to each subject. (Table 1 shows 
vote profiles.) The subjects then negotiate using chat room style English and standard 
abbreviations to divide $15 (‘purse’) between themselves by simple majority-vote rule. This 
assignment of votes and distribution of money was repeated twelve or twenty-four times in each 
session of experiments. Each assignment of votes and distribution of money is called a round.  
Consider an example. One subject receives eight votes while the other five receive three 
votes each, so a majority of at least 12 determines division of the money; {12;8,3,3,3,3,3}. 
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Identify the subjects with letters consecutively from A (with 8 votes). Subject A may propose to 
divide the money evenly with B and C. In response, Subjects D, E or F could reply with a 
proposal to allow B to have six dollars and accept three dollars each themselves. Then A could 
propose a different division splitting B’s and F’s money between A, D and E. If each subject has 
strictly less than half the votes, no matter how the subjects divide the money, there is always a 
majority (by votes) that can benefit from a different division of the money. That is, all 
distributions of money in which every member of a majority coalition receives a positive 
payment form a cycling set of outcomes; the core is empty.  
Unlike most economic experiments which evaluate at least some aspects of how closely 
experimental results approximate individually rational equilibria or maximums, our experiments 
occur in an environment in which individual rationality does not provide insights about results. 
All outcomes that divide the full purse among the members of a majority with each receiving a 
positive payment, and two members receiving more than the minimum possible payment, are in 
the cycling set and among the individually rational results. The SSPI purports to identify 
reasonable aggregate outcomes without reference to human behaviour. Our experiments 
investigate how closely decisions of individual subjects, supposed to be approximately rational, 
approach an abstract, aggregate and mathematical reasonableness.  
3.2. Profiles 
We selected 18 vote profiles (Table 1) to meet several criteria. No single player had a 
majority of votes, so their cores are empty. At least one power index differed widely from the 
SSPI for each profile so that our results were not driven by some universally agreed concept of 
power beyond those embodied in the SSPI. The pi profiles approximate the power distribution in 
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40 percent of top 400 UK publicly held corporations (Leach 2002). So the power structures relate 
to natural human institutions. 
We used so many profiles for several reasons. Although Binmore (2007) found that fairness 
focal points did not affect experimental results in a bargaining game, any of many other focal 
points and transaction costs may have affected earnings outcomes (Schelling 1960, Shubik 
2002). Just as power is embodied in votes, focal points are embodied in perceptions of votes. 
People cannot use votes without perceiving them, nor can any small set of people confidently 
find all focal points that others may perceive. Sugden (1995) demonstrated the unconscious and 
un-anticipatable nature of many focal points. We hoped to prevent any focal points from 
dominating the results by providing opportunities for a variety of focal points to manifest; 
portfolio diversification in effect. Some profiles have readily observable focal points such as the 
three sixes that exactly equal the quota in profile u1. Others have more subtle focal points such as 
other sums of votes that exactly equal the quota as in w1. Sometimes apparent focal points favour 
the large player, and in other profiles they disadvantage the large player. Profiles differed in 
appearance with the large player differing from others by wide margins in some cases and small 
margins in others. In some profiles all smaller players had the same number of votes while their 
votes differed in other profiles. In some profiles, all smaller players had equal SSPI values and in 
other profiles the values differed.   
The 18 profiles fall into seven power-identical sets (Table 1) with each set identified by a 
letter. Within each of these seven sets, each player by rank has the same power as the same 
ranked player in each of the other profiles.  
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3.3. Subjects 
Our experimental design is based on approximating the assumptions of power indices in a 
human institution.  The SSPI is based on three assumptions: efficiency, symmetry, and 
additivity.   
We promoted and achieved efficiency through two mechanisms.  First, distribution of actual 
money in the experiments maintained subjects’ interest and motivated their active participation. 
See Smith (1982) for more on the role of sufficient returns for effort and other practical elements 
of social-scientific laboratory experiments. Pilot study debriefings and observations of play 
showed $10 per round motivated subjects. However, we used $15 per round to satisfy university 
human research ethics requirements, resulting in an hourly compensation comparable to that of a 
research assistant even for relatively low earners. 
Second, we selected subjects who were more interested in earning high sums by inviting 
more subjects than we needed for any particular session, and holding an auction for who we 
would use.  Each potential subject wrote a bid of what they would accept to not participate in the 
experiments.  We paid those with the lowest bids and used the others.  Average earnings were 
$30 for a twelve round game at $15 per round with six subjects. Our payoffs clustered around 
$25 for twelve round games and $50 for 24 round games.  These payoffs, although imprecise and 
subject to statistical distortion through selectivity, suggest additivity.   
Subject homogeneity is the empirical manifestation of symmetry and abstraction. 
Approximating homogeneity among the subjects is central to the experimental approach of 
creating a human environment that approaching the assumptions of power indices. We 
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endeavoured to establish this homogeneity through two distinct stages.  The first stage was 
experimental design and selection of subjects prior to the experiment taking place.  The second 
occurred after the experiments took place. We used regression to select a set of empirically 
homogeneous subjects and identified rounds which involved only these subjects.   
In order to approximate the power index assumption of homogeneous players, we did not 
follow the usual experimental economics approach of regressing results on a set of control 
variables. Instead we attempted to reduce, eliminate, or negate variation. Significant variation 
among subjects would seriously compromise the relevance of our results even if we could 
measure the effects of subject control variables.  
A coefficient different than one would not discredit the power index because the test is in a 
heterogeneous environment. Perhaps the power index functioned perfectly well, but there was an 
additional effect from heterogeneity. We would not be able to distinguish if the index yielded 
nonsense or if the index yielded a valid result that was masked by an effect from heterogeneity. 
Perhaps power compounds differently in a heterogeneous environment than in a homogeneous 
one. So, in order to be able to argue empirically against application of the SSPI to human 
institutions, we had to construct an effectively homogenous environment. 
Further, we were not investigating the effects of variation among the subjects, an interesting 
issue in its own right, but distinct from our topic. We performed analyses using control variables 
to test the effectiveness of our attempts to eliminate effective variation, to estimate potential 
distortion of our results from residual effective variation.  These analyses are detailed in Geller, 
Mustard and Shahwan (2005) and appendices 3 and 4, and relevant points are summarised here.   
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Chat rooms permit negotiation based upon logrolling (making deals using one’s votes or ‘I 
agree to vote for something you want in return for you agreeing to vote for something I want’ 
Tullock 1976 in Johnston 1977) in an environment with greatly reduced effects from factors 
other than votes. Side deals and threats are obvious and avoidable in supervised chat rooms. 
Personality and charisma have much less potential for influence when deals are made using brief 
typed statements directly relevant to voting. Subjects may be anonymous in chat rooms. In these 
experiments, subject’s identities in the chat rooms consisted of a number shared by all subjects in 
a particular game and a letter unique to each subject. (For example ‘528C’; see the screen 
examples in appendix 1.) For further protection of anonymity, we changed the player-identities 
of the subjects every six rounds.  
We collected a variety of data on the subjects in order to control for and reduce possible 
effects: psychosocial orientation, risk orientation, nationality and gender. Psychosocial 
orientation measures individuals’ preferences for receiving payments in comparison with 
payments to others (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman 1997). This Van Lange et al 
instrument divides subjects into three broad orientations and a residual category. Individualist 
subjects prefer to receive a higher payment for themselves without regard to payments received 
by others. Competitive subjects prefer to receive more than others, even to the extent of 
accepting a lower payment for themselves to cause even lower payments to others. Pro-social 
subjects will accept a somewhat decreased payment to themselves in order to gain more for 
others. We excluded subjects with a competitive psychosocial orientation because their 
willingness to waste money violates the power index assumption of efficiency. Thus, our 
subjects consisted of individualist and pro-social subjects.  
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The magnanimity of pro-social subjects was potentially problematic for the study. We 
countered the effect of social orientation by structuring the experiments such that all subjects 
would receive approximately equal voting power over the course of the game. Thus, structural 
equity would replace the perceived need for subjects to pursue equity. Our instructions to 
subjects stated that the games were fair and that anyone temporarily in a weak position would be 
in a strong position later, that all had an equal potential to earn money based upon their votes 
over the course of the game. The instructions also explicitly encouraged subjects to be self-
centred or ‘greedy’. Binford 2007 notes objections to such instructions.  We consider the 
directions appropriate since we are trying to create an institution that includes self-centeredness, 
rather than test if a model fits a relatively natural environment.  
Pilot-study results showed foreign nationality affected earnings and debriefings suggested 
English language ability to be the key issue in low foreigner performance. We limited the 
subjects to those with apparent proficiency in English.  
The experimental design mechanisms were largely effective. Gender, psychosocial 
orientation and national origin did not consistently affect earnings significantly in either the 
statistical or practical sense. Coefficients on those variables were both small and insignificant, 
with foreigners, women and pro-social subjects earning insignificantly more than their 
counterparts (Geller, Mustard and Shahwan 2005 and appendices 3 and 4).  
Experience should matter in performance. In the pilot study, we tracked experience in order 
to document the length of the learning process, if experience continued to matter over time, or if 
gains from experience were captured within a few trials of the game. Consistent with previous 
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works (for example Kelly and Arrowood 1960; Komorita and Moore 1976), six rounds of play 
appeared to impart enough experience for proficient play in this relatively transparent game. In 
our analysis we limited our observations to those in which all subjects had already participated in 
a practice round and at least six rounds for money.  
A simple test (appendix 2) evaluated attitude toward risk: aversion, love, or neutrality. 
However, risk neutral subjects earned more than others with a confidence level of p=0.05 
stratifying the sample by whether the largest subject is in the winning coalition (details in Geller, 
Mustard and 1995, appendix 4). We developed an additional control for heterogeneity by 
selecting homogenous subjects by regression analysis as explained below.  
3.4. Experiment process 
On twelve days, with one or two sessions per day, we conducted two or three concurrent 
experiments in a classroom-style computer laboratory, with each experiment involving a group 
of six subjects playing series of twelve or 24 rounds under the supervision of a proctor and a 
recorder. The subjects sat as widely as possible around the laboratory, maintaining at least one 
computer between every two subjects and seating subjects in the same experimental group more 
distantly. Each computer used by a subject had chat rooms for two player-identities, permitting 
rapid change of identities between every six rounds. The proctor and recorder for each group of 
six subjects shared a computer, participating in the chats as a single individual. Each proctor’s 
computer had files giving the listings of votes to be used each round and typical messages used 
during the rounds. Each recorder had a hardcopy sheet giving the votes for each subject and 
majorities required for each round as backup and verification against electronic records.  
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We sorted the subjects to create at least one relatively homogeneous group based on social 
orientation, risk orientation, gender, and nationality. We then assigned the subjects to computers 
without them knowing each other’s subject identities. If new subjects were participating, we 
distributed and read instructions on the game and played a practice round without money. The 
instructions (appendix 1) included procedures, rules of the game, suggestions on strategies, and 
that fifteen dollars would be divided each round. The subjects were students in the university and 
were familiar with the use of the chat rooms because the platform was used for educational 
purposes and student communication throughout the university. After we provided instructions, 
each group of six subjects with a proctor and recorder ran independently of other groups.  
Subjects within each group had the same information, communicating entirely though chat 
room windows shared by all group members. At the beginning of each round, the proctor 
submitted a message to one window, labelled ‘Group Chat’, on the subjects’ monitors saying to 
wait and do nothing until further notice (appendix 1 has screen examples). Second, the proctor 
sent a message to another window, labelled ‘Vote Vector’, on each subject’s monitor giving the 
votes for each subject and majority required for that round. All subjects in the group saw the 
same message and each knew the votes of all subjects in their group. This was the only message 
each round sent to the Vote Vector window. Third, the proctor sent a message to the Group Chat 
requesting that the subjects confirm their votes. Each subject responded with the number of votes 
assigned to them that round. The proctor and recorder confirmed each number of votes with the 
data file and hardcopy sheet, correcting any mistakes by the subjects until all subjects reported 
correct votes.  
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The proctors submitted a message to each Group Chat to begin the games. Subjects 
submitted messages proposing, rejecting, revising, or accepting various divisions of the money. 
Subjects could write plain English statements, use conventional chat room abbreviations, or use 
brief notation provided during the instructions for the game. Subjects proposing a division of 
money had to identify that proposal uniquely, using their player-identification letter followed by 
a number. They were not permitted to use threats, statements that would reveal personal 
information, or deals for anything other than divisions of money that round. Proctors could end a 
round without any payment to enforce the rules, but they never had to exercise such a 
punishment. Recorders and proctors watched the messages for the emergence of a consensus, a 
difficult task requiring two people. When subjects appeared to have reached a majority decision, 
the proctors would wait briefly to permit additional proposals and submit a call for votes. 
Subjects could change their acceptance of a proposal if they wished at any time until they replied 
to the proctor’s call for votes. Each subject could then submit a message supporting one 
proposal. The proctor and recorder then counted the votes. If there was no winner, the proctor 
sent a message saying to continue negotiating. When a proposal received enough votes, the 
proctor sent a message saying that the round was over, which proposal won, and instructing the 
subjects to send no further messages until the next round started.  
At the end of each round, the recorder wrote how much each subject received on the 
hardcopy sheet and the proctor confirmed the record with the messages in the Group Chat. After 
each six rounds, the proctors submitted messages instructing subjects to minimise their Group 
Chat and Vote Vector and open the alternative version of each to proceed for six more rounds 
with new identities.  
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After 12 or 24 rounds as time allowed, we ended the game and tallied each subject’s 
winnings. We paid them precisely to five cents, the smallest local denomination coin, and 
collected a receipt which included each subject’s player-identities during the game.  
4. Analysis 
4.1. Sample 
We ran 441 rounds of experiments for money. Many of these rounds included inexperienced 
subjects or were included as a pre-study for another project. We address 291 observations in this 
study.  
Thirty-one subjects participated in the experiment rounds used in this analysis. Each was the 
‘largest subject’ (in terms of votes) for between one and 26 rounds. We are missing demographic 
control data for one subject who was the largest subject for three rounds. Twenty subjects were 
male, 4 were foreign, 16 were individualist, 14 were pro-social, 4 risk averse, 4 risk loving, 15 
risk neutral, and 7 gave inconsistent answers in the risk instrument.  
4.2. Creating homogeneity 
We selected a set of subjects who performed consistently relative to each other and used 
rounds consisting only of these relatively homogenous-by-performance or ‘typical’ subjects to 
establish our results. We regressed (Ordinary Least Squares) earnings of the largest subject per 
round on the SSPI and a series of dummy variables for each of 30 subjects using 291 
observations. Earnings were expressed as a percentage of the total purse. The subject who was 
the largest subject for the most rounds (26) served as the excluded base for comparison, 
completing the 31 subjects. For subjects with more than five observations, coefficients varied 
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from a low of -18.9 to a high of 6.8 percent with the extreme low end dominated by subjects with 
few observations. Regression results are available from the authors but do not warrant 
presentation since t and R
2 statistics are of no interest. There are no issues of generalisation since 
the regression results apply only to how these subjects performed on these specific experiments.   
For subjects with low earnings and few observations, we checked their earnings when they 
were not the largest subject and found that in all cases except one that they received substantially 
less than expected in those rounds also. We classified all subjects with coefficients between -8.3 
and +6.8 percent as ‘typical subjects’. We also included as ‘typical’ the one subject with few 
observations, a very low coefficient, but usual earnings when having few votes. For 88 rounds, 
all six subjects playing in that round were typical. We consider these 88 rounds to have been 
played by homogeneous subjects, approaching symmetry.  
4.3. Measuring distortions 
Focal points arise from relative attractiveness, in some sense, of various vote profiles. A 
large subject could trigger attractiveness or aversion depending on the apparent inequity of votes.  
The votes themselves may form attractive patterns such as exactly equalling the quota. Focal 
points may be unconscious, numerous and un-anticipatable (Sugden 1995). Transaction costs 
likewise make some coalitions more attractive than others. Coalitions consisting of more subjects 
may be more difficult to form and maintain than coalitions with fewer.  Likewise, coalitions of 
players that appear relatively similar may form easier and be more stable than relatively 
heterogeneous coalitions.  This relative attractiveness may be as apparent in initial proposals by 
experienced players. Observations allow measurement of and compensation for all possible focal 
points together with potential transaction costs. 
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We have chat room records of initial proposals in 274 rounds played by experienced subjects. 
For each profile we found the number of minimum winning coalitions (winning coalitions 
without extra players) in the abstract and the number those coalitions that include the largest 
player. The ratio of the subset over the superset yields the portion of minimum winning 
coalitions that include the large player.  
Differences in attractiveness of the various minimum winning coalitions would cause initial 
offers to differ consistently from these proportions. We then found the portion of actual, 
empirical initial proposals that include the large subject for each profile. For each profile, the 
ratio of the theoretical portion of minimum winning coalitions that includes the large player 
divided by the portion of the empirical first offers that includes the large subject provides a 
metric of bias from focal points and transaction costs in favour of the large player, for each 
profile. The inverse of that ratio, when multiplied by gross earnings of large player, nets out the 
effects of focal points and transaction costs for each profile.   
Initial proposals are largely independent of specific coalitions that win any given round in the 
experiment.  Several to dozens of other proposals occur between initial proposals and final votes. 
Further, initial proposals and final agreements are different kinds of things.  An initial proposal is 
a statement by a single subject preceding any negotiation over a given vote profile. A final 
agreement is a consensus of multiple subjects following multiple proposals.   Therefore, we feel 
justified in measuring the effects of focal points and transaction costs using initial proposals, and 
then using those measures to adjust our gross observations for the effects.   
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5. Results 
Table 2 presents the average earnings for the largest subject in each profile with an 
adjustment for focal points and transaction costs, adjusted average earnings, and the SSPI. Then 
it shows the weighted average across all profiles. For ease of comparison across profiles, 
earnings and the Shapley Value are expressed as percentage of the total purse. Thus the Shapley 
Value is expressed as the SSPI.  
For fourteen of the eighteen profiles (bold in Table 2), including all six cases with more than 
five observations, the adjustment increases or decreases earnings in the direction to bring it 
toward the SSPI. The probability that fourteen or more adjustments would be the right direction 
is only 1.6%, suggesting that the metric captured important aspects of distortions from focal 
points and transaction costs. 
The overall weighted average of adjusted earnings is only four percent greater than the SSPI, 
which we consider a close fit.  The need for weighting the results and the small number of 
observations per profile preclude establishing a statistical test to potentially reject these empirical 
results as matching the SSPI. Further, earnings by round for the large subject vary a great deal by 
the nature of coalition formation. Power indices purport to give average earnings in this 
environment.  In any given round, the large subject would either be out of the winning coalition 
receiving nothing, or in the coalition and likely receiving more than their SSPI value. This yields 
a strongly bimodal earnings distribution with high variance. Thus, statistical rejection of 
matching the SSPI with results differing by only four percent would be unlikely for this sample 
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size. Practically, four percent seems very close and indicates that the SSPI and Shapley value 
correctly reflect the general nature of voting power.    
6. Conclusion 
These results support the Shapley Value and SSPI as foundations to investigate power in 
human institutions.  We conclude that these abstract mathematical constructs are closely related 
to our human world, although usually masked by innumerable complexities. This experiment 
minimises many of those complexities. The analysis measures effects from focal points and 
transaction costs, allowing them to be netted from gross experimental results. Our aggregated net 
results show that the subjects with the most votes in a variety of vote profiles earned only four 
percent more than their SSPI values. In a human institution tailored to power indices, the 
Shapley Value normalised here to the SSPI performed remarkably well.   
We conclude that a small gap separates our human world from the abstract world of power 
indices.  The SSPI provides an empirically suitable foundation for interpreting actions in human 
institutions in that it allows researchers to control for the power of votes per se. With raw voting 
power in controlled, observation researchers may focus more precisely on social, economic and 
other political influences.  
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S.S.P.I = Power of largest player according to the Shapley-Shubik Index 
 















p1 42.2  0.94  5.98 6 39.9  33.3  1.20 
p2 53.3  0.81  6.48 3 43.2  33.3  1.30 
p3 42.2  0.82  5.20 6 34.6  33.3  1.04 
p4 11.7  1.08  1.89 4 12.6  33.3  0.38 
p5 29.2  1.41  6.16 8 41.0  33.3  1.23 
p6  42.7 1.19 7.59  5  50.6  33.3  1.52 
r1  28.3 1.03 4.38  4  29.2  36.7  0.80 
r2 49.5  0.83  6.19 7 41.3  36.7  1.13 
r3 66.7  0.93  9.29 3 61.9  36.7  1.69 
s1  20.0 0.88 2.65  3  17.7  31.7  0.56 
s2  50.0 1.00 7.50  4  50.0  31.7  1.58 
s3 36.7  0.88  4.86 4 32.4  31.7  1.02 
t1 46.7  0.67  4.70 3 31.3  30.0  1.04 
t2 52.7  0.75  5.94 5 39.6  30.0  1.32 
t3 40.0  0.62  3.69 4 24.6  30.0  0.82 
u1 4.8  1.88  1.34 7  8.9  30.0  0.30 
v1 39.2  0.72  4.21 8 28.0  26.7  1.05 
w1 55.0  0.64  5.25 4 35.0  40.0  0.88 
Weighted overall average  88     1.040 
Bold: 14 of 18 profiles, multiplier is suitable magnitude relate to 1.   
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Appendix 1: Subject instructions 
 
We provided these written instructions to subjects when they were seated in the computer 
laboratory. Before experiments with subjects who had not previously played, we reviewed the 
instructions verbally, emphasising: the procedure of the game; use of the chat room. eg. do not 
close the chat rooms in between rounds; that players should try to make as much money as they 
could; ethical considerations such as consensual participation, equal potential for all participants 
to earn money, the possibility of earning nothing; that there should be no communication outside 
of the chat room or between rounds; and that all proposals could be changed to the advantage of 
a new coalition of players, and that the purse is really $15 per round in contrast to the written 
directions. 
 
Player Instructions for the Power Index Game 
 
You’re about to become a ‘player’ in an experimental game that investigates the influence that 
voting power of electoral groups has on democratic decisions. Confusing? A player could 
represent a political party and all its voters or a corporate board member where votes could be 
the number of your shares. The procedures are really quite simple and you get to make some big 
money! 
 
The Game is as Follows: 
 
-  You will be divided into groups, but you won’t know whom you’re playing against. 
-  You will communicate only through open First Class chat rooms (not private). 
-  You will be given a username such as player A, or B. 
-  A game consists of twelve rounds. 
-  In each round you are allocated a different number of votes, e.g. 12 or 2 votes. 
-  In each round your group has $15 to divide democratically. 
-  Division of money is done by offering a proposal, and accepting the proposal. 
-  Each round goes for a maximum of 5 minutes. 
-  At the end of all the rounds you get the sum of what you earned in CASH. 
 




It is difficult to grasp the relationship between votes and power and so is getting used to the 
games notation. 
 
You will see a ‘vote vector’ like this: 
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This tells us that: 
-  We are in round 5 
-  Player A has 41 votes 
-  Player B has 35 votes etc… 
-  To win this game the players who agree on a proposal must have at least 52 votes combined 
to win. 
 
Lets say you are playing for $10 in this round. To offer a proposal in the open chat room you 
could use the following notation: 
 
Prop B1: A5 B5   
 
This tells us that: 
-  Player B is making his/her first proposal (prop B1) 
-  Player B offers A $5 and B $5 
-  The combined votes (if A accepts) is 76, this proposal has majority votes and is hence 
accepted. 
 
If Player A doesn’t accept and player B wishes to make a second proposal it should be titled 
Prop B2, or just B2. 
 
To accept a proposal Player A could write: 
Supports B1 
 
An example of a game for the above vote vector is as follows: 
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Players in the 
group # 528 
Negotiations 
begin; present your 
proposals here, a 
maximum of 5 
minutes before
Enter the number of 
votes you have so 
proctor knows there 
are no 
misunderstandings
Enter your support 
of a proposal. 
Proctor announces 
winner for this 
round 
Note: Example is from the pre-study with a purse of $10. 
 
Here you can see that the ‘proctor’ announces which proposal wins. Proposal A2 has since 
players A, D, and E all support A2 giving a total of exactly 53 votes. Whereby, A receives $5.40, 
E $1 and D $3.60. i.e. A 5.40, E 1, D remainder Prop A2  
 
It is also interesting to note that just because you’re allocated are large amount of votes doesn’t 
necessarily mean you will get the biggest earnings! Player B with 35 votes completely missed 
out! On one hand, Player B should have (once he realised that he may not get anything) offered a 
proposal like; Prop B2: A 8, B 2. He could then get $2 instead of 0. In this case player A could 
be greedier and accept this proposal, forgetting any proposals that included players C, D, or E! 
30 Focused Power Geller Mustard Shahwan 
 
 
Playing the Game 
 
At the start of the game, the proctor will send a message:  
“About to begin round 1. Send me your votes.”  
 
 Reply stating your letter and number of votes:   
“A has 41” or “B has 35” etc. 
 
Then the proctor will announce the beginning of the round:  
“Start round 1” 
 
And the end of the round or when sufficient support is shown before a proposal:  
“End of round Prop ## wins. Stop voting” At this point no more proposals can be offered or 
accepted 
 
If a proposal appears to have enough votes to win, the proctor will call a vote. (If the proctor has 
not noticed support for a proposal, you may send a message pointing out that a proposal has 
received enough support.)  The proctor will say, for example, ‘Call for votes.’  At that time you 
cast a vote for one proposal: ‘I vote for PropE89’.   There is no need to vote against a proposal 
because the Proctor will count no reply as a vote against.  So, if you want a proposal to pass, vote 
for it even if it is your proposal.  Proctors will declare if a proposal has passed or not.   
 
-  It is also not imperative that you stick to the notation examples, plain English is fine, 
however we have found that short hand is easily understood.  
-  A good message could be ‘Prop F43 is nearly winning.  Hey F, C&D and I will give you 
more.  B 3.25 C 2.00 D 2.00 F 2.75: PropB46.’ 
-  You can argue about a proposal, try to persuade other players to support your 
proposal…whatever gets you the most money! 
 
You will want to find other players whose votes can be added to yours to equal or exceed the 
minimum votes required to divide the money.  You get them to cooperate with you by offering 
them some of the money.  Of course, you want to keep as much as you can for yourself.  Other 
players will propose deals that give you nothing. Perhaps you can get some of them to share with 
you by offering them more than their current deal.   
 




-  No Private Chat rooms are allowed! 
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-  You are not allowed to make references to the world outside of the game.  You may not use 
your names or any other real world identifier. You may not make side deals such as offers to 
do homework for or threats of violence to other players in the game.  Players who violate 
these rules will forfeit their earnings and be removed from the game 
 
-  Be Greedy! Try to get as much money as possible. In previous experiments players have 
earned $60 after a couple of rounds! Don’t feel sorry for players with a small amount of 
votes. You never know in the next round they could have the majority! Everyone has the 
same potential to earn money in the game. 
 
-  If you identify two proposals with the same number and one of them passes, we will give you 




Let us review.  In each round of this game you will divide $15 between yourself and other 
players.  You will get some votes which may change between every round. You will use a Group 
chat room to discuss how the money should be divided.  You will vote on who gets the money in 
the Group chat.  Whatever you earn in this game is yours to keep.   
 
Consider some possible strategies.  You could: 
 
o  Look at every player’s votes to see what combinations can win. 
 
o  Who can help you?  Who can you help?   
 
o  Are any players dependent on your votes in particular? 
 
o  Make offers quickly hoping to make big earnings before others catch on. 
 
o  If you are left out of a proposal, think of a way to divide the money so that some of the 
players in the proposal get more by voting with you and your votes are enough with theirs 
to create a majority.  That is, break up coalitions that leave you out.   
 
 
Please keep several points in mind: 
 
-  You are playing for real money. 
 
-  You may earn nothing in this experiment. 
 
-  You don’t know who is in your group and you cannot speak during rounds 
 
-  Check the Votes Vector area because votes may change between rounds. 
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-  Be careful not to close the group chat room or the vote vector. 
 
-  It is a majority of votes, not of players that decides how the money gets divided. 
 
-  You may not offer any deal that involves anything from outside of the game.  That is, you 
cannot offer to do someone’s homework or threaten them to make them cooperate with a 
deal. 
 
-  Every majority coalition of players can be broken. 
 
-  This game is divided into rounds.  In each round, your group of players will divide $15 
among yourselves.   
 
-  Each round will last up to five minutes, but may be shorter if players reach an agreement 
sooner.  Any later and no one gets any money 
 
-  Keep an eye out for bogus proposals.  Player B for example names a proposal ‘D2’.  This is 
technically possible, against the rules, probably pointless and silly, but it could cause 
confusion. 
 
-  Make sure that your proposals contain players that will give you the minimum amount of 
votes ‘To win’. For example if B has 35 and C has 2 votes, To win is 52, then Prop B1 B5, 
C5 cannot work since the summation of the votes is only 37 
 
-  Make sure your proposals add up! If you’re dividing $15, make sure that you don’t offer A3 
B9, C5. This adds up to $17…not $15  
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Appendix 2: Risk aversion instrument 
 
In this section the alternatives are different chances that you will receive different amounts of money, given that we select your reply. We will select twenty replies for this section 
and each of these twenty will have the following chances to win the following rewards. 
 
Consider this example: 
 
   A   B   C 
(10) Chance:  100%  50%  10%  
Winnings $5.00  $10.00  $50.00 
 
Suppose that this reply was one of the twenty we chose for payment. If you selected alternative A, we would give you five dollars. IF you chose B we would flip a coin, and if it 
came up ‘heads’ we would give you ten dollars. If you chose C we would roll a ten sided dice, and if it came up 10, we would give you fifty dollars. 
 
Choose and circle A, B or C for each of the following alternatives. 
 
   A  B   C 
(10) Chance:  100%  50%  10%   
Winnings $5.00  $10.00  $50.00 
 
   A   B   C 
(11) Chance:  100%  50%  10% 
Winnings $4.00  $12.00  $40.00 
 
   A   B   C 
(12) Chance:  100%  50%  10% 
Winnings $4.50  $10.00  $45.00 
 
   A   B   C 
(13) Chance:  100%  50%  10% 
Winnings $4.00  $10.00  $40.00 
 
 
Note: This is not part of questionnaire. Risk loving answers are: C,C,C,C; C,B,C,B; and C,B,C,C. Risk neutral answers are: B,B,B,B; A,B,B,B; and C,B,B,B. Risk averse answers 
are: A,A,A,A; A,B,A,B; and A,B,A,A. Other combinations are intransitive. Focused Power Geller Mustard Shahwan 
Appendix 3: Data description: Characteristics of the subject with the most votes per round and of profiles 
 
  Number  Mean % St Dev % Min %  Median %  Max % 
Earnings 291  35.4 22.8 0  40.0  73.3 
Shapley-Shubik 291  32.8 3.0 26.7  33.3  40.0 
Male 291  72.5 44.7      
Foreign 291  7.6 26.5      
Individualist 291  50.5 50.1      
Risk Defined  288  86.5 34.3      
Risk Averse  288  16.7 37.3      
Risk Neutral  288  56.9 49.6      
Risk Loving  288  12.8 33.5      
In Winning Coalition  291  74.6 43.6      
Equal 291  38.5 48.7      
Unequal 291  43.0 49.6      
Homogeneous 291  30.2 46.0    
 








Defined Equal Unequal  Hom. 
Earnings 1.00  0.17  0.91 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 0.09  -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.08
Shapley 
Shubik  0.17 1.00  0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.43 0.51 -0.04
In Winning 
Coalition 0.91  0.05  1.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.05  -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.04
Male -0.02  0.02  -0.02 1.00 -0.46 0.13 -0.31 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.01
Foreign 0.01  -0.06  0.02 -0.46 1.00 0.21 0.50 -0.30  -0.11 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08
Individualist -0.06  -0.04  0.01 0.13 0.21 1.00 0.45 -0.04 -0.36 0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.29
Risk Averse  -0.10  -0.12  -0.06 -0.31 0.50 0.45 1.00 -0.51 -0.17 0.18 -0.01 -0.06 -0.16
Risk Neutral  0.09  0.07  0.05 0.07 -0.30 -0.04 -0.51 1.00 -0.44 0.46 0.00 0.11 -0.11
Risk Loving  -0.02  0.00  -0.01 0.24 -0.11 -0.36 -0.17 -0.44 1.00 0.15 -0.05 0.01 0.13
Risk Defined  0.00  -0.03  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.46 0.15 1.00 -0.06 0.09 -0.20
Equal -0.06  -0.43  0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 1.00 -0.69 0.00
Unequal -0.07  0.51  -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.01 0.09 -0.69 1.00 -0.10
Homogeneous 0.08  -0.04  0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.29 -0.16 -0.11 0.13 -0.20 0.00 -0.10 1.00
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Appendix 4: Largest subject earnings by control variables 
 
    pi  profiles  not pi  profiles all  profiles 
Overall average  Mean  1.010   1.131   1.078    
  St Dev  0.671   0.698   0.688    
 N  128   163   291     
  Mean in WC  1.390   1.486   1.445    
  St Dev in WC  0.296   0.330   0.319    
  in WC  93   124   217    
  Conf Int H  1.054   1.176   1.110    
   Conf Int L  0.965    1.086    1.045    
      1 0 1 0  1  0
Male = 1  Mean  1.015 0.999 1.104 1.212  1.067  1.106
Female = 0  St Dev  1.000 0.683 0.706 0.677  0.691  0.684
 N 88 40 123 40  211  80
  Mean in WC  1.395 1.378 1.476 1.515  1.443  1.450
  St Dev in WC  0.283 0.330 0.335 0.321  0.316  0.330
 in  WC  64 29 92 32  156  61
  Conf Int H  1.066 1.088 1.157 1.303  1.104  1.170
   Conf Int L  0.963 0.910 1.052 1.121  1.030  1.042
Foreign = 1  Mean  0.755 1.031 1.433 1.107  1.125  1.074
Australian = 0  St Dev  0.723 0.665 0.516 0.706  0.695  0.689
 N 10 118 12 151  22  269
  Mean in WC  1.258 1.399 1.564 1.479  1.456  1.444
  St Dev in WC  0.425 0.287 0.263 0.336  0.350  0.317
 in  WC  6 87 11 113  17  200
  Conf Int H  0.963 1.077 1.579 1.154  1.256  1.107
   Conf Int L  0.547 0.986 1.288 1.059  0.994  1.041
Individualist  =  1  Mean  0.919 1.106 1.136 1.125 1.039 1.117
Pro-Social = 0  St Dev  0.683 0.650 0.641 0.755  0.667  0.709
  N  66 62 81 82 147 144
  Mean in WC  1.333 1.429 1.416 1.564  1.388  1.503
  St Dev in WC  0.312 0.278 0.333 0.313  0.325  0.304
  in  WC  45 48 65 59 110 107
  Conf Int H  0.982 1.169 1.203 1.184  1.085  1.161
   Conf Int L  0.855 1.044 1.070 1.067  0.992  1.073
 
Earnings are expressed as a portion of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index value, for ease of comparison. 
Mean in WC and St Dev in WC give the mean and standard deviation of earnings of the largest subject 
when the largest subject is in the winning coalition.  
The mean and standard error for the largest subject’s earnings when not part of the winning coalition were, 
of course, zero. 
in WC gives the number of observations with the largest subject in the winning coalition.  
Conf Int H Conf Int L give the upper and lower bound of the earnings of the earnings of the largest subject 
whether or not the largest subject was in the winning coalition. 
Conf Int H, Conf Int L = Mean + 2(in WC/n)[St Dev in WC/(in WC)
1/2]  
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Appendix 4: Largest subject earnings by control variables, continued 
 
    pi  profiles  not pi  profiles all    profiles 
      1 0 1 0  1  0
Risk  defined  =1 Mean  0.997 1.063 1.139 1.081 1.077 1.073
  St  Dev  0.679 0.680 0.697 0.718 0.692 0.694
 n  109 16 140 23  249  39
  Mean in WC  1.393 1.417 1.490 1.462  1.449  1.443
  St Dev in WC  0.297 0.289 0.330 0.341  0.320  0.316
 in  WC  78 12 107 17  185  29
  Conf Int H  1.045 1.188 1.188 1.203  1.112  1.160
   Conf Int L  0.949 0.938 1.090 0.958  1.042  0.986
Risk Averse = 1  Mean  0.844 1.031 1.020 1.157 0.958 1.100
 St  Dev  0.695 0.674 0.718 0.694 0.707 0.686
 n 17 108 31 132  48  240
  Mean in WC  1.305 1.409 1.437 1.497  1.393  1.459
  St Dev in WC  0.335 0.289 0.328 0.332  0.331  0.316
 in  WC  11 79 22 102  33  181
  Conf Int H  0.975 1.078 1.119 1.208  1.037  1.135
   Conf Int L  0.713 0.983 0.921 1.106  0.879  1.065
Risk Neutral =1  Mean  1.055 0.928 1.170 1.084 1.117 1.022
  St  Dev  0.683 0.667 0.683 0.718 0.983 0.700
  n  76 49 88 75 164 124
  Mean in WC  1.432 1.337 1.493 1.478  1.466  1.424
  St Dev in WC  0.294 0.290 0.330 0.335  0.314  0.324
 in  WC  56 34 69 55  125  89
  Conf Int H  1.113 0.997 1.233 1.150  1.160  1.071
   Conf Int L  0.997 0.859 1.108 1.018  1.074  0.973
Risk Loving = 1  Mean  0.881 1.023 1.183 1.123  1.052  1.080
  St  Dev  0.646 0.682 0.741 0.694 0.708 0.690
 n 16 109 21 142  37  251
  Mean in WC  1.282 1.412 1.552 1.477  1.442  1.449
  St Dev in WC  0.248 0.299 0.345 0.329  0.333  0.317
 in  WC  11 79 16 108  27  187
  Conf Int H  0.984 1.072 1.314 1.171  1.146  1.115
   Conf Int L  0.778 0.975 1.051 1.075  0.958  1.045
Homogeneous=1 Mean  1.088 0.984 1.214 1.087 1.168 1.038
  St  Dev  0.682 0.640 0.729 0.681 0.697 0.682
 n 32 96 56 107  88  203
  Mean in WC  1.392 1.389 1.581 1.436  1.511  1.415
  St Dev in WC  0.297 0.298 0.320 0.327  0.323  0.314
 in  WC  25 68 43 81  68  149
  Conf Int H  1.180 1.035 1.289 1.142  1.229  1.076
   Conf Int L  0.995 0.933 1.139 1.032  1.107  1.000
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Appendix 4: Largest subject earnings by control variables, continued 
 
    pi  profiles  not pi  profiles all    profiles 
      1 0 1 0  1  0
Relatively   Mean  1.162 0.895 1.002 1.200  1.081  1.076
equal vote   St Dev  0.573 0.719 0.765 0.653  0.679  0.695
distribution=1 n  55 73 57 106 112 179
  Mean in WC  1.389 1.390 1.503 1.479  1.441  1.448
  St Dev in WC  0.268 0.325 0.335 0.330  0.303  0.330
 in  WC  46 47 38 86  84  133
  Conf Int H  1.228 0.956 1.074 1.258  1.131  1.119
   Conf Int L  1.096 0.834 0.930 1.142  1.031  1.033
Relatively Mean       1.054 1.167  0.961  1.165
unequal vote  St Dev       0.685 0.705  0.707  0.662
distribution=1 n        52 111 125 166
  Mean in WC       1.503 1.479  1.397  1.476
  St Dev in WC       0.335 0.330  0.334  0.306
  in WC       38 86  86  131
  Conf Int H       1.133 1.222  1.011  1.207
  Conf Int L       0.975 1.111  0.911  1.123
 
 